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A speaker’s use of a declarative sentence in a context has two eects:
it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that
proposition. This essay is about how to explain the second eect. The
standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing
because their use of the declarative in a context tokens the act-type
of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what’s asserted. I
propose a semantic explanation on which declaratives covertly host a
know-parenthetical. A speaker is thereby represented as knowing the
proposition expressed because that is the semantic contribution of the
parenthetical. I call this view parentheticalism and contend that it better
explains knowledge representation than alternatives. As a consequence of
outperforming assertoric explanations, parentheticalism opens the door to
assertion’s elimination from linguistic theorizing.
Keywords: knowledge representation ⋅ assertion ⋅Moore’s paradox ⋅ parentheti-
cal verbs ⋅ use-conditional meaning
1 Introduction
The use of a declarative sentence in a context has two eects: it expresses
a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. The
defectiveness of (1) and (2) illustrates the second eect.
(1) #I don’t know that Mueller investigated, but he investigated.
(2) #Mueller investigated, but I don’t know that.
Moore (1942, 1962), who rst noted the defectiveness, attributed it to a conict
between what is stated and what is implied. As he saw it, the use of a declarative
implies—in a sense of imply dierent from entailment—that the speaker knows
the proposition expressed. Discourses (1) and (2) are thereby defective because
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the stated content from one segment of the discourse contradicts the implied
content from another segment.
Let’s name the second eect the knowledge representation effect or kre.
These days, the standard explanation of kre is act-based.1 The use of a
declarative constitutes an action. Under certain conditions, that action can token
the act-type of assertion. Since an assertion represents the speaker performing
it as knowing the proposition expressed by the declarative tokening it, assertoric
uses of declaratives generate kre.
Assertoric Act
Locutionary Act
Expressing a
proposition
Illocutionary Act
Representing
speaker knowledge
Figure 1: Division of labor
The standard explanation therefore divides explanatory labor. In the termi-
nology of Austin (1962), linguistic actions factor into a locutionary and an
illocutionary act: the former is the performance of a meaningful sentence
in a context, and the latter is a further act that has properties not shared with
the locutionary act. Expressing a proposition is a locutionary act because a
proposition is or is determined by a declarative’s meaning in a context. However,
kre is attributed to an illocutionary act because it cannot be traced back to a
declarative’s meaning in a context.
This essay oers a semantic explanation of kre loosely inspired by Moore’s
original diagnosis of his discourses. I call it parentheticalism because kre is
traced back to a declarative covertly hosting the verb know with a rst-person
subject in a parenthetical position. My proposal is that discourses like (1) and (2)
are defective because the proposition contributed by the hidden parenthetical
of a declarative in one segment of the discourse contradicts the proposition
expressed by a declarative in another. A consequence of the view, if adopted,
is that explanatory labor does not need to be divided between locutionary and
illocutionary acts. Both eects are locutionary.
I begin by further motivating kre (§2). With supporting data laid out, I
discuss how to probatively explain kre (§3). Then parentheticalism is proposed
(§4-§5), and argued to be preferable to standard act-based explanations of kre
1 Consider the knowledge norm of assertion proposed by Williamson (2000). He is followed
by Adler (2002), Blaauw (2012), Benton (2011, 2012, 2016a,b), DeRose (2002, 2009), Kelp
(2016), Reynolds (2002), Sutton (2005), Schaer (2008), Simion (2016), Turri (2010, 2011,
2013), and numerous others.
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and a variety of semantic explanations (§6). I conclude with a brief discussion
of what assertion may be needed for if it does not explain kre (§7). I express
optimism for the conclusion voiced by Cappelen (2011, 21) that “’assertion’. . .
is not a category we need in order to explain any signicant component of our
linguistic practice.”
2 Knowledge representation
Let’s state kre precisely.
knowledge representation effect (kre)
For a speaker S and unqualied declarative d expressing a proposi-
tion p in a context c, S ’s use of d in c represents S as knowing p in
c.
Represents in kre is a placeholder term. Words like expresses, indicates, or conveys
work just as well. It stands-in for an account of how the use of a declarative
in a context is associated with a conversational participant accepting—after
the declarative’s use—that the speaker knows or takes herself to know the
proposition expressed.
Unqualied is another term to highlight. Declaratives are qualied only if
they contain epistemic vocabulary that hedges or conditions how a proposition
is expressed. Throughout this essay, I dwell on parenthetical verbs such as the
think-parenthetical in (3).
(3) Mueller investigated, I think.
Limiting kre to unqualied declaratives makes explicit an often unstated as-
sumption in the literature on assertion that qualied declaratives cannot token
the act-type of assertion.2 There is a good reason for this limit. Hooper (1975,
101) observes that “a parenthetical qualies. . . by suspending the implication
that the speaker knows the proposition to be true.” It achieves this suspension
eect by representing the speaker as occupying the position specied by the
qualifying term.
(4) Mueller investigated, I think. But I don’t know that.
Conrmation that a qualied declarative does not represent knowledge is that a
sentence like (3) cannot be extended into a defective discourse like (1) or (2)
by accompanying it with a denial of speaker knowledge. In (4), the speaker
represents herself as thinking thatMueller investigated and that is consistent with
not knowing as much.
2 Williamson (2000), Adler (2002), and Garcia-Carpintero (2004) are notable exceptions.
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The data that supports kre comes in three categories. The rst is conver-
sational data consisting of generalizations about how conversations unfold as
turn-taking activities. The second is clausal data consisting of generalizations
about the meaning or felicity of unqualied declaratives in a context. The third
is normative data consisting in generalizations about when a speaker is liable to
censure or blame for using an unqualied declarative in a context. I motivate
kre by presenting some conversational and clausal data. I leave discussion of
the normative data for another time. My presentation does not exhaust the data
available because my primary aim is to illustrate kre, an eect that is widely
acknowledged.
2.1 Conversational data
Participants usually respond to the prior use of a declarative by accepting,
rejecting, or challenging the proposition expressed. Polite challenges like
(5b) request elaboration about the speaker’s epistemic position and impolite
challenges like (6b) are accusations.
(5) (a) Mueller investigated.
(b) Why do you believe that? / How do you know that?
(6) (a) Mueller investigated.
(b) You don’t believe that! / You don’t know that!
Polite challenges are insightful because of what they presuppose. Why do you
believe that? presupposes that the speaker believes because ⌜why p?⌝ presup-
poses p (Bromberger 1966; Pietroski 2002). Likewise, How do you know that?
presupposes that the speaker knows because ⌜how do you φ?⌝ presupposes the
speaker φs. The presuppositions become transparent in answers: I believe Mueller
investigated because. . . answers the rst and On the basis of. . . , I know that Mueller
investigated answers the second.
The presuppositions reveal that participants often accept that the speaker
believes or knows even when challenging that speaker.3 Since there are conver-
sations where participants do not accept that the speaker believes or knows before
the use of a declarative, the declarative’s use is what causes that acceptance.
kre explains why a declarative’s use has this eect. Knowledge requires belief.
A participant therefore accepts that the speaker believes or knows because the
3 objection: Kvanvig (2009) argues that challenge data proves too much and too little about
what position is represented. Participants can challenge with reference to stronger or weaker
positions like Do you think that?. reply: Turri (2010) oers a number of compelling replies. One
important reply is that knowledge is special because it gures in all of the conversational data
when many other epistemic positions do not. See van Elswyk (2018) for further discussion.
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use of the declarative represented her as knowing and believing the proposition
expressed (Unger 1975; Williamson 2000).
Some observe that speakers rarely respond to challenges by detailing how
they meet the requirements for knowledge. Instead, speakers state their evi-
dence. This observation is thought to provide evidence that knowledge is not
represented.4 However, the questions in (5b) and (6b) still presuppose that the
speaker believes or knows.5 An explanation is therefore still required for why
a participant changes her presuppositions only after a declarative is used. kre
provides that explanation.
2.2 Clausal data
Circle back to Moorean discourses. They take either an omissive or commissive
form (Green and Williams 2007). Examples (7) and (8) are omissive because
a proposition is expressed and a speaker disavows belief or knowledge in that
proposition.
(7) #I don’t believe/know that Mueller investigated, but he inves-
tigated.
(8) #Mueller investigated, but I don’t believe/know that.
Commissive discourses are illustrated in (9) and (10). They are commissive in
the sense that a proposition is expressed and speaker avows belief or knowledge
in that proposition’s negation.
(9) #Mueller investigated. But I believe/know that he did not.
(10) #I believe/know that Mueller did not investigate, but he did.
Each of the four discourses rings discordantly as if inconsistent. But not all
are. Only the commissive form with an avowal of knowledge is. Given that
knows presupposes its complement, discourses like (9) presuppose and express
an inconsistency. The rest are consistent. Concerning the omissive forms, that
Mueller investigated and that the speaker does not believe or know as much can
both be true. Ditto for the commissive form with an avowal of belief. It can
4 Lackey (2007, 2008), Kvanvig (2009), and McKinnon (2012) make this observation.
5 question: What about the suggestion in McKinnon (2012) that the challenges are
presuppositionless? reply: First, the initial evidence they have presuppositions remains. Second,
the contrary evidence has alternative explanations. She notes, for example, that the speaker often
demurs when a challenger doubles-down with But do you know that?. McKinnon’s explanation
of the demurral is that the presupposition is missing. An alternative explanation is that speakers
demur as a way of deescalating. See Brown and Levinson (1987) on the pragmatics of politeness.
Another alternative, given epistemic contextualism, is that focus on knows changes the relevant
alternatives that need to be eliminated for knowledge. Then the speaker ceases to know in the
new context.
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be true that the speaker believes that Mueller did not investigate even though
Mueller did investigate.
Whatever the variety, kre explains the interpretive discord. The use of the
declarativeMueller investigated represents the speaker as knowing in that context.
So omissive forms with a disavowal of knowledge involve a contradiction
between what is represented in one segment and what is expressed by the
disavowal in another (Kp∧¬Kp). Since knowledge requires belief, omissive forms
with a disavowal of belief involve a contradiction between what is required by
a representation in one segment and what is expressed by the disavowal (Bp ∧¬Bp). Commissive forms are explained dierently. They express contradictory
attitudes. When knowledge is avowed, the commissive form expresses that
the speaker knows a proposition and its negation (Kp ∧ K¬p). With an avowal
of belief, commissive forms similarly express belief in a proposition and its
negation (Bp ∧ B¬p).6
Moorean discourses are not just defective to say. They are also defective
to believe. Some follow Shoemaker (1995) to maintain that we do not need
an explanation of Moorean speech because an explanation of why they are
defective to believe is enough.7 But Moorean speech requires independent
explanation for two reasons. First, Moorean discourses are defective in a manner
that is distinctively linguistic. Many discourses are irrational to believe but still
felicitous to say such as outright contradictions or All of the evidence indicates that
Mueller investigated, but I refuse to believe that. Second, Moorean discourses are
an instance of a much wider linguistic phenomenon. As Black (1952, 26) rst
noted, discourses such as Damn! But I have no heightened feelings are similarly
defective even though damn expresses a speaker’s emotional state as opposed to
her belief in a proposition.8
So far, we have focused on unqualied declaratives because they alone are
regarded as having the power to be assertoric. But considering qualied and
unqualied declaratives side-by-side furnishes important data about unqualied
declaratives.
(11) Mueller investigated.
(12) Mueller investigated, I believe.
6 question: What about alternative explanations of Moore discourses? Lackey (2008), Douven
(2006, 2009), Kvanvig (2009, 2011), Goldberg (2015), and Fleisher (forthcoming) all opt for
alternatives. reply: A complete discussion of alternatives is beyond this paper’s scope. See
McGlynn (2014) and Benton (2016b) for some discussion. Note that many alternatives attempt
to assimilate defectiveness to irrationality or irrelevance. But discourses like Mueller investigated
and 2 plus 2 equals 6 can be irrational to believe and irrelevant to say without exhibiting the same
interpretive discord of Moorean discourses.
7 Replies to Shoemaker (1995) abound. See Albritton (1995), Rosenthal (1995), Larkin (1999),
Atlas (2007), and Williams (2013). 8 See Searle and Vanderveken (1985) and Woods (2018)
for related discussion.
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(11) diers from (12) in that the speaker expresses that Mueller investigated
with greater oomph. With kre, the strength dierence is readily explained.
Unqualied declaratives represent the speaker as knowing whereas qualied
declaratives represent the speaker has having whatever position is specied by the
epistemic term (Benton and van Elswyk 2018). A position wherein a person has
knowledge of a proposition is stronger than a position wherein a person has mere
belief in that proposition. Therefore the strength of the position represented by
unqualied declaratives is greater than that represented by qualied declaratives
like (12).
The nal data is related to qualication. Not all epistemic terms can be
used to modify the strength with which a proposition is presented. Speakers
cannot use a know-parenthetical tomodify strength (Slote 1979; Rooryck 2001a;
Benton 2011). For starters, know-parentheticals are usually infelicitous. (13)
illustrates.
(13) #Mueller investigated, I know.
There are exceptions, however.9 Suppose in the distant future two people are
debating whether Mueller was merely rumored to have investigated. Their
disagreement was then settled after watching video footage of him in court. The
following exchange results.
(14) (a) Look! Mueller investigated.
(b) Mueller investigated, I know (, I know).
The know-parenthetical is now felicitous. And yet, it makes no dierence to
the strength with which the proposition that Mueller investigated is presented.
(14b) is just as strong as (11). It is neither weaker like (12) nor stronger.10 The
explanation enabled by kre is that the use of an unqualied declarative already
represents knowledge. Whether felicitous or not, the know-parenthetical cannot
alter the associated strength by specifying that the speaker occupies a dierent
position.
9 See Simons (2007), Benton (2011), Blaauw (2012), and McKinnon and Turri (2013). Not
all exceptions claimed withstand scrutiny. Simons (2007, 1048) takes the I know in I know from
Rosenstein that Mueller investigated to be a parenthetical because the main point of the declarative
is the embedded clause. But this I know is incompatible with complement preposing—it is not
movable to a sentence-medial or sentence-nal position—and I take complement preposing to
be a necessary condition on parentheticality.
10 My characterization of the data diers from Benton (2011). He focuses on why know-
parentheticals are infelicitous. He proposes they are redundant because the declarative is already
associated with speaker knowledge at the illocutionary level. McKinnon and Turri (2013) and
McGlynn (2014) object that Benton’s explanation does not extend to know-parentheticals like
(14b) that are felicitous but redundant. Framing the data in terms of why know-parentheticals
cannot modify strength captures what is common to (13) and (14b) and does not mandate an
illocutionary explanation.
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3 Explaining knowledge representation
We saw four lines of data that kre uniformly explains. Though alternative
explanations may account for some of that data, no alternative covers all of the
data as straightforwardly. Let’s turn, then, to explaining kre. The rst question
to ask is when it occurs.
interface conditions question (icq)
For any speaker S and declarative sentence d expressing a proposi-
tion p in a context c, under what conditions C does S’s use of d in c
generate kre in c?
While an answer to icq identies which declaratives have kre in a context, an
answer does not identify the source of kre in a context. Accordingly, the next
question about kre seeks an explanation for whatever answer is given to the rst
question.
interface explanation question (ieq)
For any speaker S and declarative sentence d expressing a proposi-
tion p in a context c, why does S’s use of d in c generate kre in c under
conditions C?
These are the interface questions. We arrive at a complete view of kre only
after both are answered. To just answer icq is to say when but not why a
declarative has kre. It enables us to predict but not understand kre. To just
answer ieq leaves us with less. We would be equipped to sketchily explain why
a declarative has kre if kre is had, but powerless to predict kre. Resolving the
questions jointly is what is probative.
An answer to icq predicts when the use of a declarative in a context generates
kre. We can assess answers according to whether this prediction is accurate.
That can be done by returning to the data. If an answer predicts kre to occurs
in a context c but instances of the supporting data do not occur in c, the answer
overpredicts. If an answer similarly predicts that the kre does not occur in c but
instances do occur in c, the answer underpredicts.
I propose to use Moorean defectiveness in an omissive form as a guide
to a prediction’s accuracy. An omissive Moorean discourse decomposes into
two components: a statement of p anchored to a perspective which has its
knowledge represented, the statement component, and a disavowal of speaker
knowledge in p, the disavowal component. Not all discourses comprised of
these two components produce interpretive discord.11 I identify three additional
conditions for defectiveness.
11 Focusing on discourses already helps to individuate the distinctiveness of Moorean
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We can extract the rst two conditions from the observation that the
disavowal of speaker knowledge in our initial examples is in the present tense
and indicative mood. Change either feature of the disavowal and the discord
disappears. The pair (15) and (16) show howmoving to the past tense eliminates
absurdity.
(15) #Mueller investigated, but I do not know that. present
(16) Mueller investigated, but I did not know that. past
The rst conjunct represents the speaker as knowing that Mueller investigated.
That is consistent with the second conjunct stating that the speaker did not know
that Mueller investigated at a prior time. Similarly, (18) and (19) illustrate
how the subjunctive mood eliminates the absurdity. The would in (19) ensures
that the world(s) at which the second conjunct is evaluated is dierent from the
world(s) at which the rst is evaluated.
(17) #Mueller investigated, but I do not know that. indicative
(18) Mueller investigated, but I would not know that. subjunctive
Accordingly, discourses exhibit omissive Moorean absurdity only if they satisfy
the schemata ⌜p, but I do not know p⌝ or ⌜I do not know p, but p⌝. However,
satisfying either schema is still not sucient. Tense and verbal mood have the
benet of being overt. Neither can be changed in the disavowal component
without failing to instantiate the schema. But there are features of the discourse
that can be changed in subtler ways.
The statement component can be anchored in a context to a perspective
other than the speaker’s. Wittgenstein (1980, 80) gives the example of a railway
announcer required to report the arrival of a train they do not believe will arrive.
The announcer can report the arrival time and follow that announcement with
Personally, I do not believe that without defect. A natural explanation is that the
report of the train’s arrival does not represent their own epistemic position—it
represents the railway’s. The use of the adverb personally marks the contrast
between positions. No absurdity results because there is no contradiction in
the railway representing themselves as knowing via their spokesperson and the
announcer disavowing their personal knowledge.
defectiveness. It explains why speakers toggling between multiple conversations can felicitously
say Mueller investigated in one conversation and I do not know that Mueller investigated in another
(Hinchman 2013). By toggling, the speaker never builds a discourse in the same conversation. It
also explains why sentences like I falsely believe that p can have an interpretation as p and I believe
non-p and not be defective (Sorensen 1988; Crimmins 1992). They are not defective because
they are not discourses.
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Let’s remain neutral on how the use of a declarative in a context is anchored
to a perspective. However we explain anchoring, Moorean absurdity requires
that the perspective be the same across the discourse. I call this the anchor
identity condition.12 In other words, the perspective to which the statement
component is anchored in a context c needs to be identical to the perspective to
which the disavowal component is anchored in c. Since the disavowal component
contains the rst-person indexical I, we can put the anchor identity condition
thusly: the perspective of the statement component in c needs to be identical to
what I denotes in c.
Let’s say that the use of a declarative d in a context c with content p is m-
extendible if and only if an infelicitous discourse can be formed with d in c that
instantiates the schema ⌜p, but I do not know p⌝ or ⌜I do not know p, but p⌝
while the anchor identity condition obtains. m-extendibility is a proxy for kre
because Moorean absurdity is a byproduct of kre. Answers to icq can therefore
be assessed according to whether they correctly predict m-extendibility. An
answer overpredicts if and only if the answer predicts the presence of kre in
c but the declarative is not m-extendible in c. Likewise, an answer underpredicts
if and only if the answer predicts the absence of kre but the declarative is still
m-extendible.
4 Parentheticalism
With kre motivated and the requirements for its explanation detailed, my
explanation can be oered. I contend that the use of an unqualied declarative
in a context represents the speaker as knowing the proposition expressed because
the declarative contains a know-parenthetical specifying as much that is typically
zero expressed. kre is therefore a semantic phenomenon. I call this view
parentheticalism.
Parentheticals kick up a cloud of tricky questions at the syntax-semantics
interface. However, parentheticalism does not require a particular syntax
or semantics. A know-parenthetical has whatever syntax overt parentheticals
have and contributes to the meaning of a declarative in whatever way other
parentheticals contribute.13 Myproposal—to borrow a term fromFara (2015)—
12 The condition helps to explain other non-absurd discourses instantiating the schemata. For
example, Fileva and Brakel (forthcoming) present discourses like The Grand Canyon Skywalk is
safe, but I do not believe it is safe where the statement component is anchored to a third-person
perspective but the disavowal component reects the rst-person. I suspect it also helps with the
case discussed by Coliva (2015) where a speaker utters a discourse that expresses a previously
unconscious belief.
13 Since I take parentheticals to be English’s way of compensating for a lack of grammaticized
evidentials, the syntax I prefer is one on which parentheticals occupy an evidential or evidential-
like projection. See Rooryck (2001a,b), Giorgi (2010), and Hedberg and Elouazizi (2015) for
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piggybacks. Assessing parentheticalism does not require us to have a full picture
of the syntax and semantics of English parentheticals. The view only requires
us to know enough to clarify its commitments as an account of how unqualied
declaratives generate kre.
I do not, then, give answers to every question kicked up. I stick to answering
those that are either raised exclusively by parentheticalism or which help
elucidate it. To that end, I rst consider the semantic behavior of parenthetical
(§4.1). Then I turn to their syntactic behavior (§4.2). Both discussions clarify
parentheticalism’s commitments.
4.1 Semantics
An expressed proposition is at-issue when it is the declarative’s primary contri-
bution in a context. Being at-issue contrasts with being not-at-issuewhich is the
status content has when it is expressed but backgrounded in the context. Familiar
examples of not-at-issue content include presuppositions and conventional
implicatures. Important to parentheticalism is that parenthetical verbs express
an extra not-at-issue proposition as opposed to contributing to a single at-issue
proposition.
Drawing on diagnostics from Tonhauser (2012), I provide two reasons
why parentheticals express a secondary proposition. The rst reason concerns
propositional anaphora. On the assumption that at-issue content alone is
available for anaphora, anaphoric expressions can be used to diagnose issuehood
based on what is felicitously targetable. If only one at-issue proposition about
the speaker’s epistemic position is expressed by a declarative with a parenthetical
as opposed to two propositions with the parenthetical contributing a not-at-issue
proposition, only the proposition about the speaker’s position should be available
to subsequent anaphors. But that is not so.
(19) (a) Mueller investigated, I think.
(b) That’s false. (#You don’t.)
(20) (a) Mueller investigated, I think.
(b) I don’t think so. (#You don’t.)
(19) and (20) show that the preferred interpretation of each anaphor is where it
denotes the proposition that Mueller investigated as opposed to the proposition
that the speaker thinks as much. That is why it is infelicitous to elaborate either
response with You don’t. That elaboration is felicitous only if the anaphors in
relevant discussion of their syntax. Ifantidou (1993), Simons (2007), and Murray (2017) also
suggest that parentheticals have evidential-like meanings. Note that languages with evidentials
frequently have a zero expressed evidential akin to what I am proposing English has with a know-
parenthetical.
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(19b) and (20b) denote the proposition about the speaker’s position. These
discourses support the conclusions that two propositions are expressed and that
the parenthetical’s contribution is not-at-issue.
The second reason for the parenthetical’s not-at-issue status concerns pro-
jection. If a parenthetical contributes a not-at-issue proposition distinct from the
at-issue proposition, that not-at-issue proposition should project. A proposition
p projects if and only if p is conveyed even when the expression contributing
p appears under the scope of an operator that stops entailments. Accordingly,
projectability is diagnosed by putting the relevant expression under the scope of
negation or modal expressions like it is possible that.14 For example, consider the
appositive who is a former FBI director.
(21) It is false that Mueller, who is a former director of the FBI,
investigated.
(22) It is possible (that) Mueller, who is a former director of the FBI,
investigated.
The appositive contributes that Mueller is a former director and that proposition
is conveyed even though it appears under the scope of entailment-canceling
operators. The proposition contributed by a parenthetical similarly projects
around the operators.
(23) (a) It is false (that) I think that Mueller investigated.
(b) It is false, I think, that Mueller investigated.
(24) (a) It is possible (that) I think that Mueller investigated.
(b) It is possible, I think, that Mueller investigated.
For comparison, the rst sentence in each pair contains a rst-person subject and
attitude verb in a non-parenthetical position. Consider (23). The It is false that in
(23a) predicates falsity of a proposition to which I think is the subject and verb.
(23b) is noticeably dierent. What is claimed to be false has nothing to do with
what the speaker thinks. That Mueller investigated is claimed to be false. What
explains the dierence is that the parenthetical in (23b) contributes a not-at-issue
proposition that projects. (24b) is similar.
The previous data serves double-duty. In addition to showing the not-
at-issue status of parentheticals, the data illustrates how they take wide-scope.
The natural interpretation of the parenthetical in (23b) is that the speaker
thinks that it is false that Mueller investigated. Likewise, the interpretation of
14 Projectability is also diagnosed by placing the content-contributing expressions in questions
and the antecedents of conditionals (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000). But parentheticals
are infelicitous in questions and the antecedents of conditionals as I shortly discuss in §4.2.
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the parenthetical in (24b) is that the speaker thinks it is possible that Mueller
investigated. Such interpretations are only accessible if the parentheticals
interpreted higher than negation and modals.
Parentheticalism is therefore committed to the covert know-parenthetical
contributing a not-at-issue proposition that is distinct from the at-issue propo-
sition expressed by the declarative in a context. In part due to its not-at-
issue status, the secondary proposition will not be available for anaphora and
will dodge entailment-canceling operators to take wide-scope. Though this
commitment does not immediately impact how the interface questions are
answers, §6 will show how it is central to parentheticalism outperforming
alternative explanations.
4.2 Syntax
Since parentheticalism piggybacks the syntax of know-parentheticals on the
syntax of other parentheticals, it is only committed to I know being covert in
unqualied declarative that occur within syntactic congurations that already
tolerate parentheticals. Put dierently, parentheticalism abides by the following
constraint.
overt constraint
For any syntactic conguration S , unqualied declarative d, and
qualied declarative d’, If d is dependent in S , then d represents the
speaker as knowing the at-issue proposition of d if and only if S is
still grammatical were d substituted with d’.
The overt constraint provides an easy way to discern when a know-parenthetical
is hiding. If we cannot use another parenthetical to qualify the dependent
but apparently unqualied declarative, the conguration is not one capable of
hosting a covert know-parenthetical.
To clarify the congurations parentheticalism is committed to hosting a
know-parenthetical, let’s consider common ones. Borrowing a distinction from
Murray (2017), two questions about embedding should be distinguished: whether
the parenthetical can embed in a particular position and whether the parenthet-
ical is interpreted in that position if it embeds. We begin with conditionals.
(25) and (26) shows that a parenthetical cannot embed in an antecedent but can
embed in a consequent.
(25) #If Mueller, I think, was appointed, then Mueller investigated.
(26) If Mueller was appointed, then, I think, Mueller investigated.
That a parenthetical can qualify the consequent is not a surprise given that it
is the main clause (Bhatt and Pancheva 2006). But the parenthetical is not
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interpreted in the consequent. It receives an interpretation in (26) where it
scopes over the conditional.
Turn next to coordinating structures. For each, I investigate whether their
dependent declaratives can be qualied simultaneously and individually. Start
o with conjunction.
(27) Mueller investigated, I think, and Trump worried, I heard.
(28) Mueller investigated, I think, and Trump worried.
(29) Mueller investigated and Trump worried, I heard.
A parenthetical plays nice with conjunction in every which way. Just one
conjunct can be qualied or both can be. When one conjunct is qualied, the
sentence is occasionally ambiguous between a reading where the parenthetical
takes wide-scope over the entire conjunction or where it qualies just the
conjunct where it appears. However, disjunctions are a dierent story. Fewer
embeddings are grammatical.
(30) #Mueller investigated, I think, or Trump worried, I heard.
(31) #Mueller investigated, I think, or Trump worried.
(32) Mueller investigated or Trump worried, I heard.
Displayed by (30) is that parentheticals cannot simultaneously qualify disjuncts.
That sentence crashes. The failure of individual disjuncts being qualied is
shown in the remaining examples. (32) is acceptable only because the sentence-
nal position encourages a wide-scope interpretation where the parenthetical is
not interpreted where it appears. In comparison, (31) is middling at best because
the parenthetical’s sentence-medial position encourages an embedded reading
that is not available, but the parenthetical can be interpreted by some as taking
wide-scope over the disjunction.
The nal congurations I consider involve a declarative being a complement
to either a verb or noun. Both congurations are illustrated with sentence-
medial and nal parentheticals.
(33) Rosenstein believes, I think, that Mueller investigated.
(34) Rosenstein believes that Mueller investigated, I think.
(35) Rosenstein has the idea that Mueller, I think, investigated.
(36) Rosenstein has the idea that Mueller investigated, I think.
The examples exhibit uniformity. A parenthetical can appear in a verbal or
nominal complement, but it is not interpreted in a complement. In (33) through
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(36), the parenthetical takes wide-scope over the main clause concerning the
beliefs or ideas of Rosenstein.
A generalization jumps out. Unless the parenthetical qualies a dependent
declarative that is located in a conjunction, the parenthetical is always interpreted
wide-scope if it can syntactically embed.
configuration position embedded in situ wide-scope
Conditional
Antecedent
Consequent ✓ ✓
Conjunction
Both conjuncts ✓ ✓
First conjunct ✓ ✓
Second conjunct ✓ ✓
Disjunction
Both disjuncts
First disjunct ✓
Second disjunct ✓ ✓
Complements
Verbal ✓ ✓
Nominal ✓ ✓
Figure 2: Embedded parentheticals
What this means for parentheticalism is signicant. As per the overt constraint,
kre is not predicted for declaratives in the antecedents of conditionals, dis-
junctions, or complement clauses. The only declaratives predicted to be m-
extendible are unqualied declaratives and conjunctions where the conjuncts are
not already qualied.15
5 Knowledge representation explained
The interface condition question or icq concerned the conditions under which
the use of a declarative represents the speaker as knowing the at-issue proposi-
tion. The answer parentheticalism oers is that the use of a declarative represents
the speaker as knowing when the declarative hosts a know-parenthetical. The
interface explanation question or ieq concerned why those were the conditions.
The related answer is that kre is generated as a matter of linguistic convention. It
is part of the grammar of English that a know-parenthetical surfaces exclusively
in conjunctions and independent declaratives.
15 This distribution is an important reason why the covert element is a verb as opposed to an
as-parenthetical like as I believe or as far as I know. Unlike parenthetical verbs, as-parentheticals
embed. Entertain If Mueller was, as I believe, appointed, then Mueller investigated and Suppose, as far
as I know, that Mueller investigated. The competing proposal that an unqualied declarative hosts
an as-parenthetical therefore overpredicts kre. For related discussion of overpredicting kre for
embedded declaratives, see §5.3 and §6.3.
15
To see parentheticalism in action, let’s return to the data from §2. As a
reminder, parentheticalism is not committed to a particular semantics or syntax
for parentheticals. Any semantics which explains their not-at-issue status and
any syntax which accounts for their distribution will do. Nevertheless, the
view’s explanatory power is best showcased by adopting a particular semantics.
Accordingly, I start by oering a new semantics for parentheticals that is inspired
by the view originally in Urmson (1952, 495) that “They themselves have not. . .
any descriptive sense but rather function as signals guiding the hearer to a proper
appreciation of the statement.” Then I show how parentheticalism explains the
data.
5.1 A multidimensional semantics
A semantic theory is multidimensional when a sentence in a context can have
multiple semantic values. I oer amultidimensional semantics for parentheticals
that draws on a proposal inaugurated by Kaplan (1999) and formally rened by
Gutzmann (2015). Central to this semantics is a distinction between terms that
are descriptive and expressive.
Descriptive expressions contribute to truth-conditions. Truth-conditional
meaning or t-meaning—given a dedicated assignment function ∥ ⋅ ∥t—is famil-
iarly represented as a set of worlds in which a sentence is true. The t-meaning
of Mueller investigated is found below.
(37) ∥Mueller investigated∥t = {w | Mueller investigated in w}
A t-meaning is assessed for its truth. For example, Mueller investigated is true at
a world w if and only if w ∈ ∥Mueller investigated∥t.
Expressives contribute to use-conditions where use-conditional meaning or
u-meaning—given its own assignment function ∥ ⋅∥c—is representable as a set of
contexts (Kaplan 1999). Let’s assume with the Kaplan of an earlier essay that a
context is a tuple ⟨cS, cw, . . . ⟩ consisting of objects such as cS, the speaker of the
context, and cw, the world of the context.
(38) ∥Ouch∥u = {c | cS is in pain in cw}
Then an expressive like ouch has a u-meaning along the lines of (38). It is the
set of contexts in which the speaker of that context is pained in the world of the
context. A u-meaning is assessed for felicity as opposed to truth. But felicity is
truth-like in its nature. An instance of Ouch is felicitous at a context c if and only
if c ∈ ∥Ouch∥u.
I propose that parentheticals have u-meaning. They place conditions on the
felicity of a declarative’s use in a context as opposed to its truth in that context.
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To illustrate, consider a think-parenthetical. It has the semantics stated in (39)
where it is a function from the proposition associated with the main clause to a
u-meaning requiring the speaker of the context to think that proposition in the
world of that context.
(39) ∥I think∥u = λp.{c | cS thinks p in cw}
Such a semantics delivers. Not-at-issue status falls out of parentheticals having
u-meaning. Their contribution projects because entailment-canceling operators
apply only to t-meaning. Likewise, the contribution does not license anaphors
like the demonstrative in That’s false! because anaphors only target propositions
from the t-meaning dimension.
The semantics also facilitates an simple account of representation. When
detailing kre in §2, I said that represent was a placeholder. It stands-in for a more
nuanced account of how the use of a declarative in a context is associated with
a conversational participant accepting that the speaker knows or takes herself
to know the proposition expressed. On the view proposed, representation is
an eect of u-meaning. Declaratives represent by hosting parentheticals with
u-meaning requiring the speaker to occupy the position specied.
There is a wrinkle. We want a fully compositional semantics where the rst-
person subject and verb constituting the parenthetical have u-meaning because
of their syntactic position. We do not want to posit widespread ambiguity for
every such verb between a t-meaning and u-meaning.16 So far, the semantics
does not deliver that. To iron out the wrinkle, let us introduce an operator ‘⊗’
that sits in the parenthetical position and converts the expression into one with
u-meaning.
(40) ∥⊗ I think∥u = λp.{c | cS thinks p in cw}
We can think of ⊗ as a dimension-shifter. It takes an expression from one
dimension and shuttles it to another. It is therefore a kind of shunting operator
that is commonplace in multidimensional theories that enable compositional
interaction between dimensions (McCready 2010; Gutzmann 2015). I save the
technical details for the Appendix. What matters is that having u-meaning is
compositionally derived.
Deploying this semantics in service of parentheticalism, we arrive at the
multidimensional meaning below for an unqualied declarative like Mueller
investigated. Nothing new or extravagant happens at the level of the declarative’s
t-meaning.
16 Attempts to explain parentheticals as force-indicators like Searle and Vanderveken (1985)
have this problem because there is no way to convert an expression that contributes to truth-
conditions to one that indicates force through semantic composition. See van Elswyk (2018) for
discussion.
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(41) ∥Mueller investigated∥t = {w | Mueller investigated in w}
(42) ∥Mueller investigated∥u = {c | cS knows that Mueller investigated
in cw}
However, the declarative now has a u-meaning because of its covert know-
parenthetical. An unqualied declarative in a context is therefore assessable for
truth and felicity.
5.2 Conversational data
With a semantics in hand, turn to the challenge data. A participant can challenge
either content contributed by a declarative. To challenge t-meaning is to
challenge its truth. To challenge u-meaning is to challenge its felicity. An
illustration is below.
(43) (a) Mueller investigated, I think.
(b) That’s false! truth challenge↝ The actual world w@ is not an element of {w | Mueller
investigated in w}
(44) (a) Mueller investigated, I think.
(b) You don’t think that! felicity challenge↝ The context of use c@ is not an element of {c | cS thinks that
Mueller investigated in cw}
Unqualied declaratives license the same challenges. By containing a covert
know-parenthetical, they have u-meaning representing the speaker as knowing
the t-meaning.
(45) (a) Mueller investigated.
(b) That’s false! truth challenge↝ The actual world w@ is not an element of {w | Mueller
investigated in w}
(46) (a) Mueller investigated.
(b) You don’t know that! felicity challenge↝ The context of use c@ is not an element of {c | cS knows that
Mueller investigated in cw}
Since the declaratives have the same t-meaning, (43) and (45) enable the
same truth challenge. The felicity challenges are dierent because the u-
meaning is dierent in each. Given parentheticalism, challenge data reects that
participants often doubt whether the felicity condition imposed by the know-
parenthetical is satised.
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5.3 Clausal data
Next up is the clausal data. While exploring how to understand how expressives
impact entailment, Kaplan (1999) drew a distinction between meaning and
semantic information. For him, two expressions could have dierent meanings
in the object-language, but still possess the same semantic information in the
meta-language. As an example he considers ouch versus I am pain. They do not
have the same meaning—they are not synonymous. But, still, they carry the
same semantic information.
Gutzmann (2015, 24) provides a way to see this informational sameness
clearly.17 The following lowers a u-meaning into a t-meaning by lling in the
contextual parameters.
lowering
If c = ⟨cS, ch, cw⟩ is a context and CS = {⟨x, y, z⟩: R(x, y, z)} is a set of
contexts given by a relation R, then ⇓c = {w’: R(cS, ch, w’}.
Applying ⇓c( ⋅ ), the lowering operator, to ∥ ⋅ ∥u thereby produces a set of worlds
from u-meaning. Applied to Kaplan’s example of ouch and I am pain where cS isS , we get (47) and (48).
(47) ∥I am in pain∥t = {w | S is in pain in w}
(48) ⇓c∥ouch∥u = {w | S is in pain in w}
Lowering elucidates howmeaning in the t-dimension and u-dimension can carry
the same information while not being synonymous. An upshot is that a lowered
u-meaning can now enter into entailment relations. For example, ∥I am in pain∥t
and ⇓c∥ouch∥u are now mutually entailing.
In the multidimensional semantics proposed, the defectiveness of Moorean
discourses is owed to what happens across semantic dimensions. Consider rst
omissive discourses. They are owed a cross-dimensional contradiction. The u-
meaning of the rst part of the discourse contradicts both the t-meaning and
u-meaning of the second part. Attend to the ⇓c-meaning of (49) alongside the
t-meaning of (50).
(49) Mueller investigated.∥(49)∥t = {w | Mueller investigated in w}⇓c∥(49)∥u = {w | S knows Mueller investigated in w}
17 Another way is given by Predelli (2013, 68). He introduces the notion of settlement.
Translated into our current terminology, an expression e settles a declarative d if and only if,
for every context c such that c ∈ ∥e∥u, ∥d∥t is true in c. As result, an expression like ouch settles a
declarative like I am in pain. Compare to (47) and (48).
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(50) But I do not know that.∥(50)∥t = {w | S does not know Mueller investigated in w}⇓c∥(50)∥u = {w | S knows S does not know Mueller investigated
in w}
They entail the falsity of one another. The second contradiction takes the same
route. Since know is semifactive, the ⇓c-meaning of (50) entails its t-meaning.
So the ⇓c-meanings of (49) and (50) contradict.
What about the commissive form? It is defective by the light of kre because a
speaker characterizes herself as being in an irrational position where they believe
or know a proposition and its negation. Parentheticalism’s spin is that a speaker
cross-dimensionally states that they are in that position. For example, form a
discourse with (49) and (51).
(51) But I believe that Mueller did not investigated.∥(51)∥t = {w | S believes Mueller did not investigate in w}⇓c∥(51)∥u = {w | S knows S believes Mueller did not investigate
in w}
The ⇓c-meaning of (49) entails that the speaker believes that Mueller investi-
gated. But conjoining that with the t-meaning of (51) or the ⇓c-meaning of (51),
which entails its t-meaning, states an irrational position.18
In explaining Moorean discourses, the syntactic component to parenthet-
icalism is just as important as its semantic component. Yalcin (2007, 986–
987) observed that Moorean conjunctions are surprisingly felicitous when the
conjunctions appear in the antecedents of conditionals or as complements to
verbs like suppose.
(52) Suppose that Mueller investigated, but I don’t know that.
(53) If Mueller investigated and I don’t know that, then there is
something I don’t know.
18 question: Garcia-Carpintero (forthcoming) notes that Moorean discourses have presuppo-
sitional analogs where a speaker disavows knowledge of a presupposition introduced by the
statement component. A referee asks whether parentheticalism explains the analogs. reply:
I have two initial responses. First, explanations of the analogs come for free on certain theories
of presuppositions. With a satisfaction theory, for example, presuppositions already have to
be common ground (Stalnaker 1973; Heim 1982; Beaver 2001). If the attitude required for
grounding is belief or knowledge, disavowing knowledge of presuppositions is tantamount toKp ∧ ¬Kp or Kp ∧ ¬Bp. Second, parentheticalism does plausibly extend. When a sentence has
a presupposition r, embedding that sentence under an attitude licenses the inference that the
attitude holder believes r (Kartunnen 1974; Heim 1992). Parentheticals are no exception. By
positing a covert attitude that takes wide-scope (§4.1), parentheticalism predicts that unqualied
declaratives license the inference that the speaker believes the presuppositions. Since knowledge
requires belief, disavowing knowledge of presuppositions yields a contradiction between the
disavowal and the inference.
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Parentheticalism predicts this distribution with the overt constraint. Since
know-parentheticals are only present in conjunctions and independent declar-
atives, they are absent everywhere else. Mueller investigated is not therefore
m-extendible in the antecedents of conditionals or the complements to suppose
because the parenthetical is not present.
After Moorean discourses, additional clausal data involved the strength
dierence between qualied and unqualied declaratives. Parentheticalism
explains the contrast in line with the strength dierence between know and
other verbs like believe, think, heard, guess, and suppose. Unlike the verbs we
have considered, know is semifactive.19 It presupposes its complement. Since
unqualied declaratives host a know-parenthetical, unqualied declarative are
stronger because they host the stronger verb. When a declarative hosts a dier-
ent parenthetical, knowledge is not represented because the know-parenthetical
is replaced by another parenthetical.
The nal clausal data to explain is why know-parentheticals cannot be used
like other parentheticals to modify the position represented. The explanation
oered by parentheticalism has a straightforward and an elaborate component.
The straightforward part is that declaratives with overt know-parentheticals dier
from unqualied declaratives only in that parenthetical is overt. No strength
dierence results because the same verb is hosted in a parenthetical position. But
parentheticalism should also help us understand why overt know-parentheticals
are typically infelicitous.
And it does with some elaboration. All of the instances in which an overt
know-parenthetical is felicitous are ones where the parenthetical is modied.
I oer two examples. Benton (2011, 685, fn.2) observes that the addition of
adverbial modiers like now enables a know-parenthetical to be felicitous. (54)
demonstrates.
(54) Mueller investigated, I now know.
Likewise, the other instances noted in the literature all require the know-
19 objection: Since know is semifactive, parentheticalism predicts that the at-issue proposition
of an unqualied declarative is presupposed. On the assumption that presuppositions are
mutually accepted, parentheticalism bizarrely predicts that the at-issue content of an unqualied
declarative is already accepted. reply: The rst prediction is not unique to parentheticalism. It
is an instance of a puzzling generalization rst noted by Hooper (1975). Whenever semifactives
appear parenthetically, the at-issue content of the declarative is identical with the semifactive’s
presupposition. To add to the puzzle, semifactives are typically used parenthetically when
their presuppositions are informative. Consider the contexts in which Mueller investigated, I
realize(d) or Mueller investigated, I discovered are felicitous. So declaratives with semifactive
parentheticals always presuppose their at-issue content, but rarely have at-issue content that is
mutually accepted. Accordingly, parentheticalism does not make the bizarre prediction. Know-
parentheticals have informative presuppositions just like other semifactive parentheticals. Many
questions about semifactive parentheticals undoubtedly linger. Fortunately, parentheticalism is
entitled to piggyback on their answers.
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parenthetical to receive contrastive focus like our earlier example in §2.2.20 A
boring yet important fact about covert elements is that they are dicult to mod-
ify. For intonational modication like contrastive focus, the diculty is obvious.
Modication requires pronunciation and covert elements are unpronounced.
Other varieties of modication are not much dierent. You cannot modify what
you cannot see or hear. The explanation I oer is that know-parentheticals are
governed by the following grammatical rule.
overt-for-modification rule
When know occupies the parenthetical position, the subject and verb
must be zero expressed unless the verb is modied.21
The rule explains the distribution we have observed. Declaratives with an overt
know-parenthetical that does not receive intonational nor adverbial modication
are infelicitous for breaking the overt-for-modication rule. However, declara-
tives such as (55) and (14b) are not infelicitous because they satisfy the exception
of the rule.
6 Alternative explanations
Parentheticalism explains kre as a semantic phenomenon. But is it preferable
to rival explanations? To motivate that it is, I rst compare parentheticalism
to the traditional answer citing the act-type of assertion. That answer requires
the declaratives that token assertion to be demarcated from those that do not.
The demarcation is then what answers icq by predicting which declaratives
are m-extendible. I consider two common demarcations (§6.1-6.2). Then I
compare parentheticalism to semantics alternatives that do not posit a covert
know-parenthetical (§6.3-6.5). Compared to each alternative, parentheticalism
is argued to supply a better explanation.
20 See Simons (2007), Blaauw (2012), and McKinnon and Turri (2013). Blaauw suggests that
the focused parenthetical reinforces by representing the speaker as knowing that they know p.
But he bases this analysis on the mistaken assumption that parentheticals contribute to truth-
conditions. An improved explanation appeals directly to contrastive focus. Suppose focus
evokes alternatives that contrast conveys are eliminated. If alternatives to know-parentheticals
are parentheticals specifying weaker epistemic positions, focus reinforces by conveying that the
speaker does not occupy these positions. Simons (2007, 1048) gestures at a similar explanation.
21 Note that parentheticals are limited in what modication the grammar allows them to
receive. See Hooper (1975) and Rooryck (2001a,b) for discussion. Accordingly, the overt-
for-modication rule is implicitly restricted to modication that is grammatically permitted for
parentheticals.
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6.1 Intentional demarcation
Many demarcate the mere use of a declarative from an assertion with speaker
intention.22 The account of assertion in Bach and Harnish (1979, 42) illustrates:
In uttering e, [a speaker] S asserts that p if S expresses: (i) the belief
that p and (ii) the intention that [a hearer] H believes p.
Though their account makes belief as opposed to knowledge the position
expressed in a context, their account is easily modied to accommodate kre.
We merely adjust condition (i) to state that knowledge is the attitude expressed
through a speaker’s act of assertion.
A benet of an intention-based demarcation is the ease with which it answers
ieq: kre is caused in a context when a speaker’s belief and intention are expressed.
But the informativeness of an intentional answer to both questions then depends
on an account of the expression-relation. Some never explain the expression-
relation. Others give a psychological account. Bach and Harnish (1979, 17)
take this route. Their account explains the expression-relation as a reexive
intention orR-intention. AnR-intention is an intention had by a speaker to get
the hearer to respond in a particular way by means of recognizing the speaker’s
intention to get the hearer to respond in that way.
An intention-based demarcation underpredicts kre. The view of Bach and
Harnish (1979) still illustrates. Without diculty, we can imagine situations
where one or more of the two intentions required in conditions (i) and (ii)
are absent. Maybe the speaker has the rst intention but not the second
because they want to state for the record what their position is inside a room
of people who vehemently disagree. Or, maybe they have neither intention.
Borrowing an example from Alston (2000, 48), perhaps the speaker does not
have hearer-directed intentions because their job is to announce train departures
in a busy station where people are rapidly coming and going. In these settings,
kre is predicted to not occur because an assertion did not happen. And yet,
the declaratives are m-extendible. By not underpredicting, parentheticalism
therefore outperforms any explanation of kre that demarcates declaratives with
speaker intention.
22 See Grice (1989), Strawson (1964), Schier (1972), Bach and Harnish (1979), and Loar
(1981) for such a view. When the going gets tough, Davidson (1984), Searle and Vanderveken
(1985), and Dummett (1996) fall back on intention. They merit mention because they are often
misinterpreted as maintaining that the link between a declarative and the act-type of assertion is
entirely conventional.
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6.2 Default demarcation
Another demarcation holds that a subset of declaratives can or do token assertion
by means of some default.23 Accordingly, the use of a declarative in a context
generates kre unless the default is overridden. The attraction of a default-based
demarcation is that one can add to their open-ended list of default overrides
anytime an instance of a declarative that does not generate kre is encountered in
the conversational wild.
Default demarcations have two defects. The rst is that it does not provide a
predictive answer to icq as long as the list of overrides remains open-ended. For
those who explain kre as a byproduct of assertion, the default demarcation there-
fore ensures that the locutionary/illocutionary interface remains mysterious.
Each use of a declarative needs to be individually considered to decide whether
it belongs on the override list. By not answering icq, ieq remains unanswered
as well. We cannot inquire about the source of kre under certain conditions if
those conditions have not been identied. In contrast, parentheticalism dispels
mystery. It predicts without any exceptions that only unqualied declaratives
and conjunctions thereof generate kre in a context.
The second problem is that many methods for adding a declarative to the
list of exceptions are unreliable at demarcating declaratives generating kre from
those that do not. It is instructive to consider examples. Jary (2010, 161)
assumes that it is essential to assertion that the speaker is presented as the
source of evidence. As a result, he maintains that an assertion is not tokened
when “witnessing the act itself either is, or is presented as, sucient grounds for
accepting the proposition expressed.” He provides (55) and (56) as examples.
However, each is m-extendible.
(55) I hereby oer my resignation.
(56) On my word, I’ll never speak to Mark again.
(57) #I hereby oer my resignation. But I do not know that I hereby
oer my resignation.
(58) #On my word, I’ll never speak to Mark again. But I do not
know that, on my word, I’ll never speak to Mark again.
Another example is Garcia-Carpintero (2004, 153-154). He provides a short
list of overrides that includes declaratives prefaced with once upon a time, let me
23 Consider Williamson (2000, 258) with his frequently quoted line: “In natural language,
the default use of declarative sentences is to make assertions.” Among others, he is followed
by Williams (2002), Weiner (2005), and Garcia-Carpintero (2004). Roberts (2018, 349)
articulates a variant where assertion is linked to the declarative clause by a norm that can
be “overridden when other general pragmatic considerations or other linguistic conventions
indicate a dierent intended interpretation.”
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remind you of the following, or therefore, declaratives used in a classroom during a
test, and declaratives with parentheticals. What appears to motivate inclusion on
his list are judgments about what act-type is tokened. Declaratives prefaced with
Let me remind you of the following, for example, appear to be acts of reminding
as opposed to acts of asserting. Though qualied declaratives belong on such a
list, the declaratives remain m-extendible for every other override mentioned.
Consider (59) through (61).
(59) #Let me remind you of the following: Mueller investigated.
But I do not know that Mueller investigated.
(60) #Once upon a time, Mueller investigated. But I do not know
that.24
(61) #Either Mueller or Comey investigated. Comey did not.
ThereforeMueller investigated. But I do not know thatMueller
investigated.
The extra linguistic material even boosts the felt absurdity in (61). Since the
speaker is represented as knowing that Mueller investigated on the basis of an
argument by elimination where each premise they also represented themselves
as knowing, the disavowal conicts with the knowledge represented in the
argument’s conclusion and premises.
A nal example of a commonly held override involves elicited declaratives.
Sometimes speakers are prompted to use an unqualied declarative in a context
where there is no expectation that they know the proposition expressed. Instead,
they are requested to occupy a weaker epistemic position. Exchanges (62) and
(63) illustrate.
(62) (a) If you had to guess, did Mueller investigate?
(b) ?Mueller investigated.
(63) (a) Did Mueller investigate, do you think?
(b) ?Mueller investigated.
Adding elicited declaratives to the open-ended list is an intuitive suggestion,
especially when the position requested corresponds to a traditional speech act-
type like guessing. However, what is intuitive does not always track when kre is
generated. Both elicited declaratives are m-extendible.
24 A non-absurd interpretation of (60) is available if the anchor identity condition is violated. If
the speaker is breaking from their perspective as the narrator to tell the audience what they know
in another perspective, (60) can be felicitous. Discourses like these are known as free indirect
discourses. For more on how such discourses shift the meanings of context-sensitive expressions
like I, see Schlenker (2004) and Sharvit (2008).
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(64) (a) If you had to guess, did Mueller investigate?
(b) #Mueller investigated. But I don’t know that.
(65) (a) Did Mueller investigate, do you think?
(b) #Mueller investigated. But I don’t know that.
Additionally, many of my informants volunteered that the initial unqualied
declaratives in (62b) and (63b) are dispreferred. This is why I annotated them
with a ’?’. What is preferred is that the elicited declarative be qualied to specify
the position requested like (66b) and (67b).
(66) (a) If you had to guess, did Mueller investigate?
(b) I guess that Mueller investigated.
(67) (a) Did Mueller investigate, do you think?
(b) Mueller, I think, investigated.
Such a preference is easily explained by parentheticalism. Since the unqualied
declaratives in (62b) and (63b) represent the speaker as knowing, the speaker is
not fullling the request to answer the question with a weaker position. Only
declaratives hosting the matching parenthetical do.25
Though there are undoubtedly other overrides to consider, I take these six
to be representative. Parentheticalism better explains kre than an assertoric
explanation that demarcates with a default by fully resolving the interface
questions and by not relying on a case-by-case method for predicting kre that is
unreliable.
6.3 Mood alternative
Let’s turn to semantic explanations that do not posit a know-parenthetical.
Sentences sort into clausal types that are individuated dierently from one
language to the next. We can theorize about what instances of a type have
in common by hypothesizing that there is a dedicated mood morpheme that
appears in every sentence of that type. The place to slot these morphemes into
a sentence is somewhere in the left periphery, the region in a syntactic tree that,
for a declarative, mediates how an underlying proposition relates to a broader
discourse or a bigger clause in which the declarative is embedded as a constituent
25 Such a preference is to be expected if parentheticals are English’s way of compensating
for a lack of evidentials as I suggested in fn.13. Some languages with evidentials allow polar
interrogatives like Did Mueller investigate? to host an evidential. Instead of being anchored to the
speaker’s source of evidence, evidentials in polar interrogatives are anchored to the addressee’s
(Speas and Tenny 2003). The semantic eect, described by Murray (2017, 44), is that “the
evidential indicates the expected source of evidence for the requested answer.” This is what the
preference reects. For a syntax of interrogative parentheticals like do you think? where they
occupy an evidential projection, see Haddican et al. (2014).
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(Rizzi 1997). Let’s therefore assume that a declarative clause contains a mood
morpheme.
What is the meaning of this morpheme? Some might suggest that the
semantic contribution of the morpheme in a context is kre. But this suggestion
is a non-starter. A reason why Frege (1879, 1892) distinguished illocutionary
force and content was that declaratives can be dependent clauses in a variety of
syntactic congurations. Sentences (68) through (71) illustrate. Each contains a
dependent occurrence of (that) Mueller investigated. None represent the speaker
as knowing as much.26 A mood-based alternative therefore overpredicts the
presence of kre for dependent declaratives.
(68) I do not know that Mueller investigated.
(69) Suppose that Mueller investigated.
(70) If Mueller investigated, then Comey did not.
(71) Either Mueller investigated or Mueller didn’t investigate.
To drive the point home, consider (68). It should be a contradiction given the
mood-based alternative. The mood morpheme in the dependent declarative
would convey that the speaker knows and that would contradict the proposition
expressed by the independent declarative that the speaker does not know. But it
does not ring contradictory.
Parentheticalism does not overpredict. Kept on target by the overt constraint,
it predicts that kre is absent from the dependent declaratives in (68) through
(71). In response to an overprediction problem, some who opt for a mood-based
explanation of assertoric force stipulate that the element responsible for force
disappears in dependent declaratives.27 A defender of the mood-based alterna-
tive might follow suit. But stipulation fails to answer ieq. Without independent
evidence corroborating that the mood morpheme is missing in the examples, no
theory-neutral explanation is available. In contrast, parentheticalism can answer
ieq by citing distribution data.
6.4 Performative alternative
The Performative Hypothesis or ph attempted to explain away speech acts by
positing a covert performative verb in the main clause of every declarative (Ross
1970; Sadock 1974). According to ph, declaratives like Mueller investigated are
elliptical for I (hereby) say/assert that Mueller investigated. Act-types like assertion
26 Geach (1965) calls this the frege point. See Stenius (1967), Searle (1969), Hare (1970),
Dummett (1973), Zimmerman (1980), and Pendlebury (1986) for early discussion. See Green
(2000) and Starr (2014) for more recent discussion. 27 For example, see Bierwisch (1980) and
Krifka (2001).
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were no longer regarded as necessary, given ph, because the grammar did the
explanatory work instead.
The hypothesis is worth mentioning because it has two problems that
reappear for proposals I discuss shortly. The rst is a well-known problem
(Lycan and Boër 1980; Levinson 1983). (73) but not (72) can be true when
nobody investigated. By regarding (72) as elliptical for (73), ph cannot explain
the dierence in meaning.
(72) Mueller investigated.
(73) I say that Mueller investigated.
The second problem is new and involves m-extendibility. A declarative with a
performative verb like say is not m-extendible. But, as we have seen, unqualied
declaratives are.
(74) I say that Mueller investigated. But I don’t know that.
Therefore ph is ill-suited to facilitate the elimination of speech act-types from
linguistic theorizing. The failure to assign proper meanings is generally fatal.
When it comes to eliminating the assertion, ph is useless because it bizarrely
predicts that no unqualied declarative is m-extendible.
Though ph is accepted by few, many posit a covert assert operator. The
motivation is often the same: a linguistic phenomenon is being explained that
is easier to account for in an embedded environment than an unembedded
environment. To ease explanation, the unembedded is assimilated to the
embedded by positing a covert operator.28 The view of Hacquard (2006, 2010)
illustrates. To explain the dierence between epistemic and root modals, she
makes modals relative to an event and has a sentence host a variety of event
binders. Then the dierence between modal avors is a product of which event
binder restricts a modal. In handling epistemic modals not embedded under an
attitude, she assumes that the left periphery possesses an additional syntactic
projection representing the speech event. That projection hosts an assert
operator as the topmost event binder. According to Hacquard (2010, 103),
the assert operator inuences the at-issue proposition expressed by a declarative
such that she glosses an unqualied declarative likeMueller investigated asMueller
investigated in all of the speaker’s doxastic alternatives.
An assert operator inherits the problems of ph. An initial choice is what it
takes to be a doxastic alternative. Many who posit the operator wae on whether
28 Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002), Chierchia (2006), and Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-
Benito (2010) make this maneuver in explaining the semantics and pragmatics of indenite
descriptions. Similarly, Hacquard (2006, 2010) does in explaining the semantics of epistemic
and root modals.
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being an alternative requires knowledge or mere belief. If it requires mere belief,
then no unqualied declarative is predicted to be m-extendible. As (75) makes
clear, there is nothing defective about disavowing knowledge of what one merely
believes.
(75) I believe that Mueller investigated. But I don’t know that.
Let’s assume that being a doxastic alternative requires knowledge. Then an
unqualied declarative can generate kre. But now the assert operator does so at
the expense of assigning accurate meanings. Though the factivity of knowledge
ensures that p is true if the speaker knows p, the speaker can fail to know p while
p is true. Presume whatever condition on knowledge you like. That condition
can fail to obtain while p remains true.
Parentheticalism sails past both problems. The rst problem is avoided
because the semantic contribution of parentheticals is not-at-issue. In the
multidimensional semantics proposed, the not-at-issue status results from the
fact that they only have u-meaning. Unlike the assert operator, parentheticals
can never alter the at-issue proposition expressed. The second problem is solved
because the covert element is a know-parenthetical as opposed to a weak assert
operator requiring mere belief.
Maybe a way around the inherited problems can be found. Even so,
parentheticalism remains preferable. First, the operator’s distribution needs
to be identied for icq to be answered. Absent an identication that handles
embedding like (68) through (71) without stipulation, parentheticalism out-
performs. Second, the assert operator has no overt form in English. It is
an entirely theoretical posit that complicates the syntax of the left periphery.
Parentheticalism is dierent. A know-parenthetical is not a theoretical posit. It
can be overt. Beyond what the syntax of parentheticals already demands, no
extra complications are required either.
Let’s take a step back and recall the Austinian distinction between the
locutionary and illocutionary levels of a linguistic action. Assertion is what
allegedly happens at the illocutionary level. However, operators are components
of a sentence’s compositional semantics that contribute to the content expressed
by that sentence in a context. Accordingly, operators only make a dierence
at the locutionary level. Assert operators are thus a category mistake. What
is illocutionary is not semantic, and what is semantic is not illocutionary. A
charitable reframing of assert operators is that they are placeholders. The
left periphery is taken to host an element that explains data like kre, which is
traditionally thought to require an illocutionary explanation. However, we need
more than a placeholder to answer the interface questions. Parentheticalism
provides what is required.
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6.5 Epistemic alternative
It is occasionally hypothesized that unqualied declaratives host a covert epis-
temic modal. Though this hypothesis is not advanced to explain kre, one may
wonder whether the hypothesized modal can serve double-duty by playing the
role it was initially slated for and explaining kre too.29 The nal alternative ts
this description. It starts with a proposal that posits a covert modal and amends
that proposal to explain kre.
To illustrate, consider a recent proposal by Giannakidou and Mari (2018).
They aim to explain how two epistemic modals can have a unied interpretation
in declaratives like Mueller probably must have investigated as opposed to an
interpretation where the higher modal embeds the lower. A component of
their proposal is that auxiliary modals like must are accompanied by a higher
projection contributing an elementO. This element is often covert and species
the speaker’s condence towards the proposition in a modal’s scope. Their
proposal can be amended with the assumption that O is present in a declarative
even when a modal is not. ThenO would specify the speaker’s condence in the
proposition that is the declarative’s meaning in a context, and might be available
to explain kre.
Another component of their proposal is that the adverb probably is the
overt realization of O. This extra commitment enables Giannakidou and Mari
(2018, 649) to explain the unied interpretation of two modals by assigning the
same meanings to Mueller probably must have investigated and Mueller must have
investigated. They have a unied interpretation because the overt probably does
not make a contribution that is not already made byO covertly. Amending their
proposal with the assumption O is present in unqualied declaratives yields a
similar consequence. Mueller probably investigated andMueller investigated become
equivalent with O just being covert in the latter.
This consequence ensures that the amendation faces many problems. The
rst few mirror the problems of ph. First, the meanings of two dierent
declaratives are mistakenly equated. Mueller investigated and Mueller probably
investigated are plainly dierent in meanings. Second, the presence of kre is
underpredicted. Declaratives with an overt probably are not m-extendible.
(76) Mueller probably investigated. But I don’t know that.
The suggestion that O explains kre therefore misres by underpredicting which
declaratives generate kre. Third, even if the suggestion thatO generates kre does
29 I thank a referee for this suggestion. Giannakidou and Mari (2018) and Kratzer (1986)
hypothesize as much. Kratzer maintains that the main clause of a declarative like If Rosenstein
appointed him, Mueller investigated hosts a covert epistemic modal like must that gets restricted by
the if -clause. That covert modal might be available to explain kre. Note that neither suggestion
is the stated view of the author(s) whose proposal it is based upon.
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not underpredict, it would overpredict because epistemic modals like probably
can appear in dependent declaratives. To illustrate, focus on attitude verbs for
which the embedding of epistemic modals is well-studied (Anand and Hacquard
2013).
(77) Suppose that Mueller probably investigated.
If O realized as probably was kre’s source, (77) would represent the speaker as
knowing that Mueller investigated. But it does not.
Though my focus has been on a particular proposal that posited a covert
modal and how that modal could serve double-duty, the problems identied
generalize. Epistemic modals dier from parentheticals in that they can con-
tribute to the at-issue content of a declarative in a context.30 Any modal
explanation of kre therefore risks mispredicting the at-issue meaning of an
unqualied declarative. Unless the modal is one that entails the proposition in
its scope, a modal explanation will underpredict kre because the modal is too
weak to render a declarative m-extendible. Finally, a modal explanation is fated
to overpredict, if it does not underpredict, because modals surfaces in dependent
declaratives that do not generate kre. Since these problems are version of
the same problems faced by performative and mood-based explanations of
kre, parentheticalism outperforms a modal alternative for the reasons already
provided.
7 Without assertion?
A consequence of parentheticalism is that explanatory labor does not need
to be divided between a theory of meaning and a theory of action. That
parentheticalism provides a unied, semantic explanation is made clear by the
multidimensional semantics. Amultidimensional semantics, in the words of Ka-
plan (1999, 18), “extend[s]. . . formal model-theoretic semantics to” phenomena
“that have been regarded as falling outside semantics.” To translate back into
Austinian terminology, we can now distinguish between two locutionary acts:
the T -meaning act and the U-meaning act.
30 Their at-issue status is clearest in two situations. First, modals can be outscoped by tense
and quantiers (von Fintel and Gillies 2007; Swanson 2010). When outscoped, the modal is
always at-issue. Second, the modal is at-issue whenever the question under discussion is about
the speaker’s epistemic position. See the Mastermind case in von Fintel and Gillies (2007) for
an example. The diagnostics of Tonhauser (2012) readily conrm the modal is at-issue in these
situations.
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Locutionary Act
T -meaning Act
Expressing a
proposition
U-meaning Act
Representing
speaker knowledge
Figure 3: Labor divided dierently
Parentheticalism locates the two eects in dierent locutionary acts. Accord-
ingly, no illocutionary act need apply for the job. kre traces back to a declarative’s
meaning in a context.
Though I have presented parentheticalism as an explanation of kre, the
hypothesis generalizes to other alleged representation eects. For example,
many maintain that it is belief as opposed knowledge that the use of a declarative
represents in a context.31 The reasons given in §6 for why a covert parenthetical
better explains kre than act-based or semantic alternatives apply to belief
representation as well. The dierence is that it is a covert believe-parenthetical
doing the explanatory work. In this way, parentheticalism plausibly outperforms
alternative explanations of position representation regardless of what position is
represented.
Is assertion now eliminable? Not yet. Assertion may be needed to explain
more than how a kre is generated. A complete argument for elimination
needs to yield the conclusion that there is no phenomena that that act-type
must explain. The arguments for eliminativism given by Cappelen (2011,
2018) are incomplete in this regard. This essay has not provided a complete
argument either. Nevertheless, let me conclude by expressing optimism about
eliminativism’s prospects.
Three jobs potentially remain for assertion. First, there are acts performed
with non-declaratives that are allegedly assertions (e.g. indirection, rhetorical
questions, subsentential utterances, gestures). Parentheticalism does not extend
straightforwardly to these acts. Assertion may be required to explain why
declaratives and non-declaratives alike can perform the same action. However,
I am optimistic that a divide-and-conquer strategy can be taken to show either
that a particular non-declarative does not generate kre or, if it does, that the
eect can be explained locutionarily.32
31 See Frege (1892), Austin (1962), Searle (1969), Bach and Harnish (1979), Grice (1989),
McDowell (1980), Davidson (1984), Brandom (1994), Alston (2000), Williams (2002), Owens
(2006), Green (2013), and Hindriks (2007).
32 In the literature, only rhetorical questions or gurative language are mentioned as examples
of indirection (Garcia-Carpintero 2016). The latter are indirections only if one assumes that a
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Next, there is normative data consisting in generalizations about when a
speaker is liable to censure or blame after using an unqualied declarative.
As a linguistic hypothesis, parentheticalism is ill-equipped. But, again, I am
optimistic that we can get by without assertion. Any explanatory limitation of
a hypothesis can be overcome by supplementation. So parentheticalism can
always be paired with an additional account of how speakers incur liability.33
There could be an epistemic norm governing both qualied and unqualied
declaratives alike that requires speakers to occupy the position represented.
Applied to unqualied declaratives, this norm would be almost indistinguishable
from a knowledge norm on assertion.
Finally, there are declaratives in other languages that generate kre and this
essay only developed parentheticalism to account for kre in English. However,
the hypothesis plausibly applies elsewhere. Consider Italian. Italian declaratives
are unqualied or qualied with parenthetical verbs that behave similarly to
English parentheticals. They cannot embed, they weaken the strength with
which a proposition is expressed, and know-parentheticals are usually infelicitous
(Giorgi 2010). Adjusting for the relevant dierences, parentheticalism may
apply to Italian complete with the overt-for-modication rule. Nevertheless,
parentheticalism fails to extend to some languages. Languages lacking paren-
theticals are an obvious example. Assuming the act-type of assertion can be
tokened in any language, assertion might therefore remain necessary to explain
kre where parentheticalism cannot. This is a possibility. Another possibility to
consider is that the grammar of such a language enables a dierent semantic
explanation of kre.34
A theme running through the preceding is that parentheticalism facilitates
assertion’s elimination from linguistic theorizing only in concert with other
hypotheses. Some will see this as a limitation of the alternative approach that
proposition with gurative content is expressed after a proposition with literal content. However,
that assumption is a minority view (Stern 2000; Bezuidenhout 2001; Wearing 2006; Camp
2006; Carston 2012). Most explanations for why rhetorical questions have assertion-like eects
are already semantics (Han 2002; van Rooy 2003). Subsentential utterances can either be
regarded as elliptical for a full declarative (Merchant 2001, 2004), or pragmatically enriched into
the content of one (Stainton 1995, 2006). The added twist required by parentheticalism is that
the elided declarative hosts the know-parenthetical, or the enrichedmeaning is multidimensional
as if it contained one. Finally, gestures can be given a multidimensional semantics wherein they
express a proposition and require speaker knowledge (van Elswyk 2018).
33 Cappelen (2011) and Pagin (2016) make related suggestions.
34 Languages with evidentials are a prime candidate. Evidentials in declaratives contribute a
not-at-issue proposition specifying the speaker’s source of evidence for the at-issue proposition.
Specifying a direct source is interpreted as stronger than an indirect source like hearsay (Willett
1988; Aikhenvald 2004). Dierences thereby result in which declaratives are m-extendible.
Surveying existing eldwork, Murray (2017) notes that every known direct and inferential
evidential is m-extendible. However, evidentials specifying hearsay are not. It is therefore
plausible that stronger evidentials represent knowledge as part of their meaning.
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parentheticalism exemplies. I encourage that it be regarded as an invitation.
For awhile, assertion has been the one-stop-shop for explaining data surround-
ing what the use of an unqualied declarative does in a context. It is time, I
believe, to explore an alternative approach to theorizing that divides the data to
better explain the data.
A Appendix
A.1 Multidimensional Ltu
The system Ltu is owed to Gutzmann (2015) and builds upon the multidimen-
sional semantic theories of Kaplan (1999), Potts (2004), and McCready (2010).
In what follows, I oer a truncated exposition. The types of Ltu are the usual
suspects plus use-conditional types.
(A1) truth-conditional types
(a) e, t, s are basic truth-conditional types.
(b) If σ and τ are truth-conditional types, then ⟨σ,τ⟩ is a truth-
conditional type.
(A2) use-conditional types
(a) u is the basic use-conditional type.
(b) If σ is any type and τ is a use-conditional type, then ⟨σ,τ⟩ is
a use-conditional type.
The vocabulary of Ltu consists of the truth-conditional connectives like ¬, ∨, ∧,
and a few special elements.
(A3) multidimensional vocabulary
(a) Use-conditional conjunction: ⊙
(b) Triviality elements: T⟨s,t⟩, Uu
Use-conditional conjunction coordinates only expressions of type u. The
purpose of the triviality elements is to provide trivial content to expressions that
have non-trivial content in only one dimension.
The interpretation function is J⋅Kc, where c is the index for context. The
interpretations of the new vocabulary elements is provided in (A4). As expected,
T and C receive trivial interpretations from J⋅Kc. T denotes the set of worlds and
C denotes the set of contexts.
(A4) (a) Jφ⊙ ψKc = JφKc ∩ JψKc.
(b) JTKc = W.
(c) JUKc = C.
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Use-conditional conjunction ismerely set intersection. Given that expressions of
type u denote sets of contexts, ⊙ forms a set of contexts that have the conditions
from the two use-conditional meanings.
The semantic value of a expression is three-dimensional. Between the t-
dimension and u-dimension lies the s-dimension. The s-dimension is needed to
facilitate compositional interaction between the other two dimensions. It stores
content that is still active for the calculation of use-conditional content. As (A5)
displays, the t-dimension and the s-dimension are separated by ‘⧫’ while the s-
dimension and u-dimension are separated by ‘●.’
(A5) t-dimension´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
t-content
⧫ s-dimension´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
u-active content
● u-dimension´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
u-saturated content
The dedicated interpretation functions introduced in §5.1 just give the interpre-
tation of a single dimension for a semantic value. Their relation to the general
interpretation function is this: J⋅Kc = ∥ ⋅ ∥t ⧫ ∥ ⋅ ∥s ● ∥ ⋅ ∥u.
To simplify the lexicon by not giving every expression a three-dimensional
meaning, Gutzmann (2015) opts for lexical insertion rules. These rules are a
principled means of extending lexical entires into three-dimensional meanings.
I detail two insertion rules.
(A6) rule for pure truth-conditional expressions
α⇒ α ⧫ α ● U, if α is a truth-conditional type.
(A7) rule for functional shunting expressions
α ⧫ β ⇒ α ⧫ β ● U, if α is of truth-conditional type and β is a
non-basic use-conditional type.
Consider (A6). It grows entries specifying only content in the t-dimension into
three-dimensional meanings with trivial u-meaning. Note also that what is in
the t-dimension is duplicated into the s-dimension. As Gutzmann (2015, §4.4)
discusses, duplication in the s-dimension enables simpler composition rules.
(A7) adds trivial content to the u-dimension for lexical entries which specify
non-trivial content only in the t and s-dimensions.
While Gutzmann (2015) has a handful of composition rules, we again only
need two. In (A8), composition in the t and s-dimension is type-driven function
application. What happens in the u-domain is dierent. Application there is
always use-conditional conjunction.
(A8) multidimensional application
α1 ∶ ⟨σ, τ⟩ ⧫ α2 ∶ ⟨ρ, ν⟩ ● α3 β1 ∶ σ ⧫ β2 ∶ ρ ● β3
α1(β1) ∶ τ ⧫ α2(β2) ∶ ν ● α3 ⊙ β3 MA
(A9) use-conditional elimination
α1 ∶ ⟨σ, τ⟩ ⧫ α2 ∶ ⟨ρ, u⟩ ● α3 β1 ∶ σ ⧫ β2 ∶ ρ ● β3
α1(β1) ∶ τ ⧫ α1(β1) ∶ τ ● α3 ⊙ β3 ⊙ α2(β2) ∶ u UE
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Next up is (A9). In the t-dimension, business is usual. But when all of the
arguments of a complex expression are saturated in the s-dimension to produce
a meaning of type u, that use-conditional content is shuttled to the u-dimension
where it is conjoined with the other use-conditional content.
A.2 Lexical entries
Our goal is to derive the use-conditional meaning of a parenthetical verb from
its syntactic position. To do that, we start o with a relational semantics for an
attitude like think that is non-committal on the details.
(A10) JthinkKc = λx.λp.T (x)(p) : ⟨e, ⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩⟩
Assuming the semantics for indexicals of Kaplan (1989), JIKc = cS, where cS is
the speaker of c. Then the semantic value of the complex parenthetical by MA
is λp.T (cS)(p) and of type ⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩. That meaning needs to be eshed out as
a three-dimensional meaning. By (A6), the attitude grows into (A11).
(A11) JI thinkKc = λp.T (cS)(p) : ⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩ ⧫ λp.T (cS)(p) : ⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩● U
Now, as foreshadowed, we introduce ‘⊗’ as a dimension shifter that lives in
the parenthetical position. It belongs to the family of shunting operators
that are standard to multidimensional theories that facilitate compositional
interaction between dimensions (McCready 2010; Gutzmann 2015). Two
important jobs are performed by ⊗: it erases content from the t-dimension and
introduces unsaturated u-content into the s-dimension. Where E is a variable
for expressions of type ⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩, ⊗ receives this semantics.
(A12) J⊗Kc = λE .T : ⟨⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩ ⧫ λE .λp.{ c | cw ∈ Ep} : ⟨⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩, ⟨⟨s, t⟩, u⟩⟩● U
In the t-dimension, ⊗ is a constant function from any ⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩ expression
to the trivial content. But in the s-dimension, it takes a ⟨⟨s, t⟩, ⟨s, t⟩⟩ expression
into a function from a proposition to a use-conditional content. The combined
meaning of (A11) and (A12) is (A13).
(A13) J⊗ I thinkKc = T ⧫ λp.{c | cw ∈ T (cS)(p)} : ⟨s, t⟩, u⟩ ● U
From here, the multidimensional meaning stated in §5.1 is delivered by the
lexical insertion and composition rules. Suppose a proposition like {w | Mueller
investigated in w} is the truth-conditional meaning of the main clause under-
neath the parenthetical. Then by lexical insertion rule (A6), the meaning of the
tense phrase is lled out thusly.
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(A14) JMueller investigatedKc = {w | Mueller investigated in w} ⧫ {w |
Mueller investigated in w} ● U
From there, (A14) composes byMAwith the shifted parenthetical (A13) to yield
the following.
(A15) JMueller investigated, ⊗ I thinkKc =
{w | Mueller investigated in w} ⧫ {c | cw ∈ T (cS)({w | Mueller
investigated in w})} ● U
We are now in a position to use UE because we have a fully saturated use-
conditional content in the s-dimension. By UE, (A15) becomes (A16).
(A16) JMueller investigated, ⊗ I thinkKc =
{w | Mueller investigated in w} ⧫ {w | Mueller investigated in w}● {c | cw ∈ T (cS)({w | Mueller investigated in w})} ⊙ U
(A16) diers from (A15) in that the content of the t-dimension is duplicated
in the s-dimension and the use-conditional content is shuttled from the s-
dimension to the u-dimension. Since use-conditional conjunction with U
simplies to {c | cw ∈ T (cS)({w | Mueller investigated in w})}, the result is the
advertised interpretation.
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